Dr. Mohamed Kawas, Progress Centre for Policies
Introduction:
The new U.S. stance on the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel has raised questions about internal disagreements within President Biden’s administration regarding rumoured imminent security agreements, including cooperation in building Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program. This contradicts the atmosphere suggested by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, hinting at separating bilateral agreements from the normalization issue between Saudi Arabia and Israel. What led to this new negative stance?
Considering this, several points are noteworthy:
• Since his visit to Riyadh in 2022, President Biden has been advocating for a Saudi Israeli agreement leading to “normal” relations, similar to what his predecessor, Donald Trump, achieved with the Abraham Accords, which subsequently led to Israeli relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.
• The U.S. and Israel have long believed that Saudi Israeli normalization would form the basis for future Israeli relations with the wider Islamic world, given Saudi Arabia’s religious, political, and moral influence among the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries.
• Saudi Arabia has shown openness and positivity towards the Abraham Accords, allowing Israeli commercial flights to pass through its airspace in 2022.
• Riyadh expressed its openness to establishing relations with Israel during meetings with U.S. officials, conditioned on a political settlement leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state. In this regard, Riyadh reiterated its commitment to the Saudi Initiative (King Abdullah’s Initiative), which became the Arab Peace Initiative after its adoption at the Beirut Summit in 2002.
• Some American media outlets have published additional conditions for Saudi Arabia, including the demand for a binding American agreement requiring congressional approval to transform it into a defense treaty obliging Washington to defend its Saudi ally in case of threats, similar to what is in place with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The second condition is American partnership in building the Kingdom’s nuclear program for civilian purposes while Saudi Arabia retains sovereignty over uranium enrichment.
• Despite the debate in Washington regarding these demands and the possibility of Congress approving agreements with Riyadh, Blinken announced during his recent visit to Riyadh on April 29 that the two countries are close to bilateral agreements that will lead to Saudi relations with Israel. The U.S. Secretary did not condition normalization for concluding agreements, but he said, “For normalization to progress, two things are needed: calm in Gaza and a reliable path to establishing a Palestinian state.”
• National Security Advisor statements on May 4 shattered the distinction between the two tracks when he announced that the Biden administration would not enter into a defence agreement with Saudi Arabia unless the Kingdom formalized its relations with Israel, stating that “a piece cannot be separated from the rest of the pieces,” according to his statements to the Financial Times.
• Some American analysts believe that the Biden administration has failed to pass the mechanism of U.S.-Saudi cooperation according to Blinken’s vision for several reasons. Firstly: Difficulty in securing two-thirds of Congress’s approval for agreements with Saudi Arabia without prior Riyadh approval of normalization with Israel. Secondly: The presidential election environment and Biden’s need not to provoke Israel’s supporters by drawing up an uncertain agreement for Israel, especially amid tension and disagreement in relations between the administration and Benjamin Netanyahu. Thirdly: Washington’s uncertainty about whether or not its agreements with Riyadh will end the eastward trend that Saudi Arabia has pursued in its relations with Russia and China and the uncertainty about Saudi Arabia’s rejection of Chinese investments in Saudi economic, technological, and defence fields. Fourthly: The contradiction in Blinken and Sullivan’s statements may reflect an ongoing conflict within the administration over the approach, resembling the one that occurred between the State Department and the White House during the Gulf crisis.
The new U.S. stance revisits the Saudi Israeli normalization issue, indicating that it will be tabled until after the U.S. elections, especially as Riyadh’s persistence on linking normalization to the peace settlement track reflects a Saudi mood not to rush to establish relations with Israel. Riyadh perceives that Biden pursues the track only as he needs to achieve a hasty electoral achievement without sensitivity to the circumstances of the Gaza war.
Conclusions:
• Contradictions within the Biden administration regarding relations with Saudi Arabia and Saudi Israeli normalization led Washington to reestablish normalization as a prerequisite for any strategic security agreements between Washington and Riyadh.
• The Washington administration did not adopt a clear approach similar to that announced by the U.S. Secretary of State, indicating that establishing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel requires a sustainable path to establishing a Palestinian state.
• Electoral concerns underpin the insistence of the National Security Advisor on the precondition of normalization before any agreement. This is not to mention, according to U.S. sources, the difficulty of convincing Congress (as demanded by Saudi Arabia) to approve the agreement without prior agreement on normalization.
• The U.S. position change also returns to Washington’s uncertainty about whether the effects of the Saudi American agreement would stop China’s expansion and encourage Riyadh’s alignment with Washington in the camp against Beijing.
