The Iranian response against Israel: A reading of the facts and an exploration of the variables
Position Assessment: Progress Centre for Policies
The response carried out by Iran on April 13-14 against Israel in retaliation for the targeting of its consulate in Damascus on the first of this month raised fears of the possibility of expanding the scope of the war in the Middle East. While it is still unknown whether Israel will respond to pressure from US President Joe Biden not to respond to the Iranian response. However, the event upended the equations that had governed the region in recent decades.
To understand what has changed, we must consider the following points:
Since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic has never carried out any military operation against Israel from Iranian territory. It previously relied on allied or loyal proxies in Palestine and a number of Arab countries, especially Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
The “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation imposed a strategic change that Tehran could not overcome in terms of Iran’s ability to continue to engage indirectly, especially when Israel targeted their sovereignty by bombing the Iranian consulate in Damascus.
The variable of the October 7, 2023 operation embarrassed Iran in the face of the Hamas movement, some of whose leaders (Khaled Meshal, Musa Abu Marzouk, Ghazi Hamad) expressed frustration with the lack of cohesion in the “axis of resistance” led by Iran. It also weakens Iran’s image in front of the rest of the “axis” factions, especially in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, who will come to bear the burden of the consequences of Iran’s actions.
The evidence of embarrassment is that the bombing of the Iranian consulate, as it is “Iranian territory” according to diplomatic custom, is not a precedent. Israel has previously carried out operations on Iranian territory aimed at assassinating Iranian scientists and officials, blowing up nuclear reactors, seizing the archives of the nuclear program, and other operations without Tehran considering the matter a violation of sovereignty that would require a direct response against Israel.
The Iranian response demonstrated the need for a response without leading to a harmful reaction to Iran itself. During 11 days, Iranian diplomacy worked to provide all the necessary information in communicating with Washington (through Switzerland and Oman) and European and regional capitals to explain the motives for the response, confirm its limitations, and adhere to the phrase “de-escalation.”
On the other hand, the Western capitals that signed the nuclear agreement (Vienna Agreement of 2015), i.e. Washington, Berlin, Paris and London, established firm positions, warning Iran of the consequences of any response. Meanwhile, American, French, and British military capabilities participated in confronting the missiles and drones and shooting them down before they reached Israeli airspace.
Iran has demonstrated well-known military capabilities in launching missiles and drones. However, despite the size of the capabilities used (estimated at about 330 missiles and drones), Iran did not launch the high capabilities it possesses, which confirms its goal for the response to be limited.
The event appeared to be a private bilateral conflict between Iran and Israel that did not receive any official regional support, nor was it sponsored by China and Russia. It was met with political and military firmness by the Western system, especially the countries directly concerned with the relationship with Iran through the nuclear agreement.
The event led to a decline in the division within the ruling elite around Benjamin Netanyahu, and to Benny Gantz arrogantly “imagining” the possibility of Israel forming an international regional alliance against Iran.
For the first time, Iranian missiles and drones threaten Israel’s security directly from Iran, which will support Netanyahu’s previous case for rejecting the nuclear agreement, citing the danger of missiles and drones in any discussion regarding the nuclear program.
Iran presented itself as the only country that would stand as a military rival to Israel, especially since it accompanied the response with positions threatening other responses directly from Iran if its interests were exposed to Israeli attacks anywhere in the world. On the other hand, it sought to communicate with the countries of the region, especially with Saudi Arabia, which confirms its keenness to maintain the state of détente in the relations of the two countries since the conclusion of the Beijing Agreement on March 10, 2023.
Summary:
– Even if Israel does not implement a response to the Iranian response, the event is an important watershed in the Middle East political landscape. The confrontation has become public and direct, disrupting the balances that Israel has become accustomed to, which raises questions about the possibilities of a major war breaking out to stabilize or correct the balance of power.
– Iran did not use its comprehensive firepower, that is, through a broad, coordinated and simultaneous attack with all the factions of its axis, which would expand the scope of its military maneuver in the future.
– The event demonstrated that a strategic principle, experienced by the Arabs in their wars with Israel, has not changed. That is, that the Western establishment headed by the United State will not hesitate to provide political and military support, regardless of the degree required, to protect and defend Israel.
– The event will accelerate the application of more international pressure to stop the war in Gaza in the near future and to engage seriously in political tracks in the near future, consolidating the conviction that the Middle East has become a hotbed for conflict, which now represents a threat to the interests of the United States and its allies.
– It is notable that the Palestine issue was absent from the vocabulary of the event, as Iran’s response came in retaliation for Israel’s bombing of the Iranian consulate and its killing of Iranian officers. In its response, Iran did not use any rhetoric related to the Gaza war. Tehran’s diplomacy said that the response was “self-defense” and did not claim any connection to Palestine and the Gaza war.
